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5Abstract
Throughout its history Bolivia has faced many conflicts, 
among others related to patterns of social, cultural 
and ethnic discrimination and exclusion. In 2003, the-
se conflicts experienced a violent outbreak leading to 
more than 60 deaths and more than 400 injured per-
sons. The 2005 Constitutional assembly has served as 
a mechanism to seek solutions for these conflicts and 
to strengthen human rights, and has initiated a process 
of redefinition of Bolivia’s national identity.
 The 2003 conflict revealed a complex mix of so-
cial, cultural, political, and institutional conflicts that 
had been neglected in the past. The dynamics of the-
se conflicts include ethnic discrimination, social and 
political exclusion of wide parts of Bolivia’s society, 
particularly of indigenous people, as well as political 
claims for a higher degree of decentralization of the 
country. These latent conflicts found their climax in the 
violent clashes during the protests of Octubre Negro in 
2003 that led to the resignation of President Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada and initiated a process of politi-
cal transition. The new political agenda included the 
strengthening of the rights of the indigenous populati-
on and their participation in the political process, and 
called, as a direct result of this conflict, for a constitu-
tional assembly with the mandate to redesign Bolivia’s 
social contract.
 This conflict was therefore the beginning of a 
political process leading to the redefinition of national 
identity in the new constitution, and had an important 
impact on the understanding and importance of diver-
sity and the rights of indigenous people in the contem-
porary political community. The constitution defines 
Bolivia now as a plurinational state, thus for the first 
time explicitly including in the concept of state all 
the ethnic and indigenous communities living in Bo-
livia. Also, many of the relevant legal norms and poli-
tical institutions have been profoundly modified and 
strengthened by this reform.
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 1 For more information on this period of 
time, see, for example: http://semana-
rioaqui.com/index.php/lectura/155-
estatuto-constitucional-de-la-junta-
tuitiva-de-1809, http://www.ucb.edu.
bo/BibliotecaAymara/docsonline/
pdf/156094194.pdf, http://www.caracol.
com.co/noticias/actualidad/junta-
tuitiva-y-plan-de-gobierno/20050713/
nota/186813.aspx.
2 Creole (in Spanish: Criollo), is the denomi-
nation for any person of European (mostly 
French or Spanish) descent born in the 
new colonies. Although legally Spaniards 
and Creoles were equal, the latter were 
generally excluded from high office in 
both church and state and discriminated 
against by the Spanish crown. Creole-led 
revolutions led to the expulsion of the 
colonial regime in the early 19th century.
3 Mestizo, plural mestizos, is the denomi-
nation for any person of mixed blood. In 
Central and South America it denotes a 
person of combined Indian and European 
extraction.
1.1. A History of Exclusion and Lack of Participation
Historically, Bolivia has been characterized by its vast cultural and ethnic 
diversity. However, its colonial and republican history has been marked by the 
continuous reproduction of inequality, social, political and economic exclusion 
along ethnic lines and the systematic exploitation of the indigenous 
population. From the point of the violent colonial conquest of Bolivia (approxi-
mately 1532-1809) the ‘civilization’ of the indigenous people has dominated 
the relationship between the native population and the Spanish conquerors. 
Later, during the fights for independence (approximately 1809-1825) indig-
enous movements became significant, but were ultimately left out once again 
in the design of the state structures. One of the first rebellions against 
Spanish rule was the indigenous uprising of Tupac Katari in 1781. This uprising 
led to a revolutionary process that culminated in the Junta Tuitiva in 1809. 
However, this initial form of independent government was defeated by the 
counterrevolution and eliminated in the first republican Constitution under 
Simón Bolívar. The Junta Tuitiva had even contemplated the regulation of 
indigenous concerns, including the organization of indigenous authorities.1  
However, during the early stages of the Bolivian republic (approximately 
1825-1982), this concept was lost and the creole2 and mestizo3 elite of the 
country embraced the concept of a nation state. 
 On the one hand, in Bolivia as in many post-colonial societies, the 
concept of nationalism has served as an instrument for nation-building 
through the process of independence and the birth of the new republic. On the 
other hand, it has led to a politics of assimilation and the forced elimination of 
all references to ethnicity from the public discourse, building on the repub-
lican concept of a citizen (Aguirre/Moreno, 2009: 3). Republican forms of 
citizenship are underpinned by a concept born during the French Revolution, 
which brought together a series of elements – including “the establishment of 
civil equality”, “the institutionalization of political rights”, and the creation of 
a “link between citizenship and nationhood” (Brubacker, 1992: 35). However, in 
a country with such a large indigenous majority as Bolivia the assimilation 
implicit in such a framing of citizenship leads to the hidden discrimination of 
this vast demographic group. As Linera states, during the republic, “one [was] 
born as citizen or indio” (2005: 15). Thus, as Mariano and Aguirre argue, 
“nationalism has been a force for unity as well as of difference” (2009: 3) in the 
history of Bolivian state formation.  
 As a consequence, indigenous people have been marginalized and 
discriminated against throughout the colonial and republican era. These 
patterns of discrimination become even more palpable in the political sphere, 
where the indigenous population has suffered systematic exclusion. Only in 
the framework of the revolution of 1952 was there an attempt to address some 
of the inequalities in Bolivia’s political setup: an agrarian reform tried to 
reduce the concentration of land in the hands of a very few and eliminated 
large-scale land ownership. The mining industry was also nationalized to 
enhance redistribution of Bolivia’s wealth. Social injustice was addressed 
74 Law No. 3464, of October 29, 1956. 
5 Constitution of the Republic of Bolivia 
from 1994, Article 171.
6 In this Article we will refer to the Bolivian 
state as ‘plurinational’, as it is used in 
the new Constitution, acknowledging by 
this the existence of several ‘nations’ that 
coexist in the new concept of ‘plurinatio-
nal state’. However, when referring to the 
character of the society, we will refer to 
‘pluricultural’ or ‘pluriethnic’, as used in 
the new Bolivian Constitution. 
through education reform and universal suffrage for all citizens was intro-
duced. It was only then, in 1956, that ‘indios’ were finally eligible to vote.4  
However, even many years after formally gaining the right to vote, political 
representation has been limited to voting for representatives of the white, 
mestizo, and Spanish speaking elite. Representation though their own social 
and ethnic group has been virtually nonexistent. This is illustrated in the fact 
that the first indigenous vice-president only took office in 1993, and the first 
indigenous president was elected as late as 2005.
 Only since the second half of the 20th century have the indigenous 
population gained more power within social and institutional spaces. Since 
1990 an indigenous movement has been created that is able to create 
consensus between the demands of the indigenous and the non-indigenous 
sectors of the population. This movement also set the basis for an indigenous 
philosophy that found its way into the new constitution. In 1990 the first 
indigenous rally marked the beginning of the process of growing indigenous 
influence in politics that we will describe in the following pages. Thanks to this 
movement, important changes have been achieved through the constitutional 
reform of 1994. This Constitution for the first time defined Bolivia as a multi-
ethnic state and recognized certain collective rights of the indigenous 
population.5 However, some scholars consider that these gains “have not had 
a real impact on the conditions of the people” (Aguirre/Moreno: 2009: 3), as 
this formal recognition did not transfer into concrete everyday improvements 
and did not affect the established social, political and economic patterns of 
discrimination. This can be seen in the example of the formal definition of 
Bolivia as a plurinational state6 which did not in fact have an effect on the 
political setup or on the concrete representation of indigenous people in 
politics by quota or other means. Also, the declaration that Bolivia was a 
plurilingual country was not followed up by concrete actions, such as the 
establishment of bilingual education or the strengthening of the use of indig-
enous languages in the public administration. 
1.2. A History of Conflicts
This pattern of structural discrimination and marginalization of a large part of 
the population has led to a fairly conflictive social life in Bolivia ever since the 
colonial conquest. For many years, the so called ‘pacted democracy’, a tacit 
agreement among the major political parties to ‘rotate’ and share political 
power, has contained public discontent and maintained a certain (although 
superficial) calm and order. However, particularly since 2000 Bolivia has seen 
a series of social conflicts, beginning with the so called ‘water war’ in 2000, 
and the ‘gas war’ in 2003 (Lüthi, 2009: 28/29). In both conflicts the primary 
triggers that provoked their outbreak were related primarily to the govern-
ment’s economic policies rather than the described pattern of discrimination 
and the social and political exclusion of certain groups of the population. 
However, they revealed the deep frustration of wide parts of the population 
with the ruling elite and the lack of political participation.
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87 Cochabamba is the fourth largest city 
in Bolivia with an urban population of 
approximately 700,000. It is located in a 
rather fructiferous valley area in the sou-
thwest of Bolivia, approximately 240km 
southeast of La Paz. Due to its moderate 
climate it is often called the "Garden 
City" and the "City of Eternal Spring". Ag-
riculture and trade are the main sources 
of income for the area.
 The ‘water war’ in Cochabamba was provoked by a massive and 
overnight increase in the price of water due to the privatization of the 
municipal water services.7 The sudden and huge increase of the water price 
left many households and small farmers incapable of satisfying their basic 
water requirements and provoked a wave of frustration and anger among the 
general population. The following weeks of protest brought together a wide 
range of social groups, united in the fight against the increase in prices for 
basic services. The two main sides of this conflict were the urban and rural 
water users on the one hand, and on the other hand the private company and 
the Bolivian government which had negotiated the privatization of the water 
services in Cochabamba.
 The conflict lasted several months, and included the intervention of 
special police forces and the military, ending with a final ‘battle’ in April 2000 
that left hundreds injured.  After this unrest, the protesters achieved the 
cancellation of the leasing contract with the private company and the 
re-assignment of the water administration back to the municipal water 
service. 
 This conflict was interpreted as an uprising against the economic 
policies and reforms of the state rather than as a conflict between ethnic or 
cultural groups. However, at the same time, the ‘water war’ has been 
described as a turning point in that it “caused many former supporters of the 
traditional parties to seek alternatives” (Van Cott, 2003: 775) and marked the 
beginning of a severe governance crisis in Bolivia. It was after these events 
that the call for a constituent assembly emerged. The years following the 
water crisis have thus have often been described as “a cycle of social unrest 
and protest” (Lacroix, 2006: 84; Lavaud, 2005: 105) and as a “climate of quasi 
permanent social agitation” (Lacroix, 2006: 90).
Historical Introduction
98 However, this decision was heavily oppo-
sed by wide parts of the Bolivian society, 
in part because of historical animosity 
against Chile; Bolivia still feels resentment 
after the territorial losses of the War of 
the Pacific in the late 19th century, which 
deprived it of access to the sea.
9 For more information on the gas war, see 
among others, http://upsidedownworld.
org/gaswar.htm.
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The Climax of the Social and 
Political Conflict and its Solution
2.1. The ‘Octubre Negro’ Conflict in 2003
In 2003 there was a repeat of the intense outbreaks of social discontent and 
underlying tensions within the state. Announced tax increases and protests by 
the police requesting better working conditions led to violent riots in February 
2003. Soon after the controversial decision of President Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada to build a gas pipeline through neighboring Chile to the port of Mejil-
lones8 in order to export Bolivia’s gas led to the so-called ‘gas war’ in 
September and October 2003. Again issues primarily related to the govern-
ment’s economic policy provoked the violent protests, but they exposed the 
detachment of the political elite from the population and expressed a need for 
ongoing reforms of the political system.  
 The gas war escalated in September 2003. Massive protests and road 
blockages paralyzed large parts of the country and led to increasingly violent 
confrontations with the Bolivian police and armed forces. The conflict left 
nearly eighty people dead and more than 400 were wounded. Among the early 
victims of these confrontations an eight year old girl was killed by the police, 
which led to further escalation of the conflict. In many places Bolivia’s indig-
enous majority was at the front of the protests, joined by peasant farmers, 
coca growers, students, union workers, and ordinary citizens. On September 
29th, Bolivia's Labor Union (COB) called a general strike that paralyzed the 
country with road closures. As the protests went on, protesters in El Alto, a 
sprawling indigenous city on the periphery of La Paz, proceeded to block the 
access routes to the capital causing severe fuel and food shortages. On 
Sunday, October 12th, heavily armed military and police escorting gasoline 
tankers tried to pass through the blockades in El Alto to get to La Paz. As the 
protesters in El Alto resisted the security forces circled the city in helicopters 
and indiscriminately fired on the protesters and into the crowds killing several 
people, including children. These deaths produced a turning point in the ‘gas 
war’. At the beginning of the conflict many protesters had been mobilizing 
against the exportation of the nation’s gas to Chile. However, after the deaths 
in El Alto and several other cities, the protesting sectors began to request the 
resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada as a condition for dialogue.9
 The 2003 ‘gas war’, also called the ‘octubre negro’, triggered a massive 
mobilization of different parts of the population, indigenous movements, 
workers’ unions, peasant farmers’ organizations and other civil society 
groups. At its peak, protesters demanded the dismissal of the president and a 
referendum on the gas issue, as well as the establishment of a constituent 
assembly. 
 The protests led to the disintegration of the government and the resig-
nation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada on October 17th. Vice 
President Carlos Mesa was sworn in as president in the middle of the protests. 
He promised a binding referendum on the gas question and to generally revise 
government policy concerning Bolivia’s natural resources and the much 
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criticized politics of privatization of this sector (Salazar Elena, 2008).  
However, soon after assuming his mandate he resigned in the middle of the 
ongoing crisis and, as was constitutionally required, he was replaced by 
Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, the President of Bolivia’s Supreme Court. Veltzé 
was sworn in as interim president and he promised a quick transition including 
the institution of a constituent assembly in order to overcome the crisis of 
governance. 
 Although the initial motive for this conflict was the decision to build the 
gas pipeline through Chile and thus a question of an economic nature, the 
‘octubre negro‘ revealed a complex mixture of conflicts with social, cultural, 
political, and institutional dimensions which had been previously neglected. 
The traditional discrimination and exclusion of wide parts of Bolivia’s society, 
particularly the indigenous population, fuelled resentment against the white, 
creole establishment. This led to a claim for more cultural and political 
recognition by the state. The multiplication of demands that the state was 
unable to satisfy provoked an erosion of the institutional stability of the state 
and a loss of its credibility (Cordero Carraffa, 2010). Additionally, the lack of 
participation in politics provoked a desire for more direct democracy, as well 
as claims for a higher degree of decentralization of the country. Therefore, a 
profound constitutional reform was a key point on the agenda emerging from 
this crisis in October 2003. The list of social and political demands that 
accompanied the popular uprising later formed the ‘agenda de octubre’. The 
diversity of underlying conflicts involved during these months of the ‘gas war’ 
revealed the “variety of actors” and “multiplicity of agendas” (Crabtree, 2005: 
15) that have characterized Bolivia’s public protests since 2000.
2.2. The Process of Conflict Transformation Through 
 a Constituent Assembly
2.2.1  The Demands for a Constituent Assembly
The context of public dissatisfaction and widespread protest against the 
government and the ruling elite favored the revalorization of the indigenous 
population by the rest of the country. Many other groups of the population, 
such as workers’ unions and peasant farmers’ organizations, had shared the 
claims of the indigenous movements during the protests. Also, this conflict 
had strengthened their capacity for political organization and had trans-
formed them into serious political actors with a clear agenda. Finally, this 
crisis reinforced the growing demand for more participation in politics and the 
state not only by indigenous movements, but by many other parts of the 
population that had been previously excluded. The most prominent example of 
this revalorization and newly emerged indigenous leadership is certainly the 
massive electoral victory of Evo Morales and his movement ‘Movimiento al 
Socialismo’ (Movement towards socialism, MAS) in the 2005 elections. Evo 
Morales came to power with 53.7 percent of all votes – with about 85 percent 
of those entitled participating.10 He is the first president to have been elected 
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with an absolute majority since the re-installation of democracy (CNE 2007: 8). 
Morales’ movement prominently took up the claims for more participation and 
social and ethnic inclusion, the fight against corruption (of a predominantly 
white elite that had governed the country since the colonial conquest) and for 
more social justice and the redistribution of the state’s resources (Cordero 
Carraffa, 2010). Also, he adopted as his own the people’s claim for a profound 
reform of Bolivia’s constitution (Whitelegg, 2009: 2). 
 There had been calls to rewrite Bolivia’s social pact through a 
constituent assembly and to strengthen direct democracy mechanisms in 
Bolivia since the early 1990’s, but with little desire from the ruling parties to 
answer. During the government of Sánchez de Lozada from 1993 to 1996 the 
inclusion of direct democracy mechanisms in the Constitution was discussed, 
but the ruling elite rejected these ideas on the basis that these mechanisms 
were associated with plebiscitary and authoritarian politics (Salazar Elena, 
2008: 5). Even though the demand for constitutional reform was revitalized by 
the social movements during the 2003 protests and formed one of the key 
promises of the ‘agenda de octubre’ (Crabtree, 2008), interim president Carlos 
Mesa demonstrated only half-hearted supported for this request. After 
Mesa’s demission, Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzé initiated the political transition, 
organized the general elections and approved the law that created the 
constituent assembly.
 The Bolivian constituent assembly served as a mechanism for finding 
solutions to the underlying conflicts that had almost plunged Bolivia into a 
civil war. Even though cultural and ethnic divisions were not the only, or even 
principle, dynamics driving conflicts such as Cochabamba’s ‘water war’ in 
2000 and the ‘octubre negro’ protests in 2003, structural discrimination and 
inequality within the population were certainly at the origins of the popular 
dissatisfaction with the state and the political elite at these times. Therefore, 
among the key demands emerging from the conflicts was the call for an 
increase in direct democracy mechanisms (Crabtree, 2007: 3).
 The constituent assembly was intended to redraw the political design of 
Bolivia by strengthening the participation of civil society, particularly of those 
social groups that had been traditionally excluded from political life, and 
initiated a process of redefinition of Bolivia’s national identity (Whitelegg, 
2009: 2). Evo Morales, as Bolivia's first indigenous head of state, was particu-
larly identified with the drive towards building a more inclusive society 
(Crabtree, 2008). Morales’ vision of a plurinational state stood in contrast to 
the previously dominant concept of republican citizenship. While in the latter 
the condition of citizenship was based solely on the formal social affiliation to 
Bolivia as a modern nation state, the new concept was characterized by the 
vision that all the different cultural and ethnic communities together would 
form the state. While in the traditional, republican concept of citizenship 
cultural and ethnic differences were subsumed into the all-encompassing 
concept of ‘the citizen’ and therefore suppressed, this new concept of 
citizenship valued and encouraged difference as one of the elements that 
would make up this new plurinational state.  
10 Actually, Morales had already participa-
ted in the previous election where, as a 
political newcomer, he was already placed 
second, with only 1.6% of difference to the 
winner, Sánchez de Lozada. This guaran-
teed him an ample opposition in Bolivia’s 
congress during his predecessor’s period 
and time to prepare his political program.
The Climax of the Social and Political Conflict and its Solution
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2.2.2  The Constituent Assembly
The constituent assembly was established by law Nº 3664 of March 6th 2006 
and inaugurated on August 6th of that same year. The assembly was designed 
as a deliberative decision-making organ, with 210 representatives elected by 
direct and universal vote. Aiming to overcome the deep and complex crisis of 
the Bolivian state the assembly was conceived as a political instrument with  
a democratic character.11 While the element of ‘deliberation’ of this organ was 
important in order to create a space for political discussion, the element of 
‘decision’ was crucial for responding to the population’s request to be taken 
into consideration in terms of national decision-making. Additionally, the 
strong representation of formerly excluded parts of the population was 
intended to create a more stable social contract between the state and its 
citizens for the future. This new social contract also included a more 
prominent role in politics for women.
 Some scholars argue that the inauguration of the constituent assembly 
reinstalled the atmosphere of constant social agitation and ended the period 
of relative calm that had followed the 2005 elections (Lacroix, 2006: 80-98; 
Lüthi, 2009: 35). However, even if it is true that again several actors started to 
clash over diverse issues, for the first time in 3 years these conflicts now took 
place in an institutional context, and not primarily on the streets. In this 
sense, the establishment of a constituent assembly has been considered by 
many as “the most appropriate reaction to the cycle of crises” (Lüthi, 2009: 
34). Its establishment invited, for the first time, social division into a legit-
imate public space. The intention of this was to mediate social conflicts 
through deliberative democratic mechanisms, assumed to be able to prevent 
such conflicts becoming violent and unstable. 
 The constituent assembly had the challenging task of engaging in a 
complete reform of the constitution, embracing several sensitive issues, such 
as the possibility of departmental autonomy,12 the recognition and implemen-
tation of cultural, linguistic and particularly legal pluralism, the development 
of the collective rights of indigenous people, and the strengthening of direct 
democracy mechanisms. In this sense, it had a unique opportunity to design 
the socio-political instruments that were needed in order to initiate a process 
of profound and substantial transformation of the Bolivian state and society, 
in the manner called for by the 2003 protests.13 Because of the nature of this 
mandate, the new constitution required two different types of legitimacy: 
political agreement from the government and political organizations; and 
social acceptance by civil society actors who had been calling for change 
(Cordero Carraffa, 2010: 75). The MAS itself characterized the constituent 
assembly as “an act of democratic revolution of the people to substitute the 
old structures after 180 years of an oligarchic regime” and “the materiali-
zation of centuries of struggle by the people” (Aguirre/Moreno, 2009: 4).
11 Law Nº 3664 of March 6th, 2006.
12 Parallel to the launch of the constitutional 
process, demands for autonomy had emer-
ged in some Bolivian departments and 
disclosed yet another major conflict which 
the constituent assembly, and the country, 
had to deal with. In 2006, the departments 
of the Bolivian lowlands, the so called 
‘media luna’ and particularly the depart-
ment of Santa Cruz, expressed a desire for 
regional autonomy.
13 Unfortunately, we will not be able to 
analyze the before mentioned conflict 
concerning the regional autonomy of the 
department of Santa Cruz, and the entire 
region of the ‘media luna’ in more depth. 
However, it was certainly another aspect 
that complicated the constitutional reform 
and the political transformation further.
The Climax of the Social and Political Conflict and its Solution
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3
Central Elements of  
the New Constitution
The new Constitution14 was approved by a referendum on January 25th 2009. 
Among the most important – and also most contested - elements in the new 
constitution are the redefinition of the state as plurinational, as well as the 
strengthening of the collective rights of Bolivia's indigenous population, the 
broadening of the mechanisms of political participation, and improvements in 
the processes of decision-making (Whitelegg, 2009: 2).
 We will analyze three of the most important changes, related to the 
cultural ‘refoundation’ of the Bolivian state and the subsequent reorganization 
of political institutions and mechanisms in the Constitution. Firstly, we will 
focus on the redefinition of national identity in the new Constitution, secondly, 
on two major changes concerning the collective rights of the indigenous 
people, namely the recognition of the indigenous languages as official 
languages and the introduction of the indigenous jurisdiction, and thirdly, on 
the deepening of the direct democracy mechanisms in the new system of the 
state of Bolivia. 
 As the traditional discrimination and social and political exclusion of the 
indigenous population had been an underlying trigger for many of the conflicts 
in Bolivia’s recent history, the inclusion of these elements in the new Consti-
tution was essential for the success of this process of reform. The demand for 
constitutional recognition of the indigenous population, for more respect for 
their ‘way of life’ and for more political participation constitute some of the 
most important, as well as the most thorny, aspects of this new social 
contract.
3.1. Redefinition of National Identity in the New 
 Constitution
3.1.1  Transformation of the Legal Basis
On February 7th 2009 the new Bolivian Constitution entered into force. Many 
of its Articles still require laws and other secondary regulation in order to 
become fully effective, but those rules that do not require legal precision have 
already become effective in the political life of the country.  
 In the new Bolivian Constitution the vision of the multinational state 
that had been a center point of Evo Morales’ political campaign, has been 
institutionalized. Unlike the previous constitution, the new constitution not 
only proclaims the ‘multiethnic and pluricultural’ character of Bolivia, but is 
entirely based on the vision of a ‘plurinational state’. This is already reflected 
in the preamble:
In times immemorial mountains emerged, rivers found their ways, lakes were 
formed. Our Amazon, our Chaco, our Altiplano and our lowlands and valleys 
were covered with greenery and flowers. We populated this sacred Mother 
Earth with different features and we understood since then the plurality of all 
14 Constitution of the Republic of Bolivia 
from 21 October 2008, as approved on 
January 25th, 2009 and proclaimed on 
February 7th, 2009.
14
things and our diversity as beings and cultures. In this way we shaped our 
peoples and we never understood racism until we suffered it in the fatal times 
of colonialism.
The Bolivian people, of plural composition since the dawn of history, inspired 
by past struggles, by the indigenous anti-colonial uprising, by independence, 
by popular liberation struggles, by the indigenous, social and syndical 
marches, by the water and October wars, by the struggles for land and 
territory, and with the memory of our martyrs, we construct a new State. […] 
We leave the colonial, republican and neoliberal State behind. We take on the 
historic challenge of collectively constructing the Unitary Social State of 
Plurinational Communitarian Rights that integrates and articulates the 
intentions of advancing towards a democratic, productive, supportive Bolivia 
that inspires peace and is devoted to comprehensive development and the 
selfdetermination of peoples. (Translation from Lüthi, 2009: 23)
 Two of the most relevant rules can be found at the beginning of the 
Constitution: Articles 1 to 3 outline the new character of the Bolivian state and 
nation. Article 1 of the Constitution defines Bolivia as a “unitary, social state, 
based on the rule of law of plurinational and communitarian character, free, 
independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized, and with 
autonomies”. It continues this exhausting list of attributes with the precision 
that “Bolivia is founded on the political, economic, legal, cultural and linguistic 
diversity and pluralism, within the context of the country’s process of 
integration”.
Bolivia se constituye en un Estado Unitario Social de Derecho Plurinacional 
Comunitario, libre, independiente, soberano, democrático, intercultural, 
descentralizado y con autonomías. Bolivia se funda en la pluralidad y el 
pluralismo político, económico, jurídico, cultural y lingüístico, dentro del 
proceso integrador del país.
 Article 2 strengthens this new concept and understanding of the state 
and its pluralist reality. It outlines the basis for the development of collective 
rights for the indigenous population. Concretely, it guarantees indigenous 
native peasant nations and peoples the right to “their self-determination 
within the framework of the unity of the State”, consisting in “their right to 
autonomy, self-governance, their culture, the recognition of their institutions 
and the consolidation of their territorial entities, in conformity with this 
Constitution and the law”:
Dada la existencia precolonial de las naciones y pueblos indígena originario 
campesinos y su dominio ancestral sobre sus territorios, se garantiza su libre 
determinación en el marco de la unidad del Estado, que consiste en su 
derecho a la autonomía, al autogobierno, a su cultura, al reconocimiento de 
sus instituciones y a la consolidación de sus entidades territoriales, conforme 
a esta Constitución y la ley.
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 Article 2 underlines the special importance of the “indigenous, native 
and peasant nations and people”, the so-called “naciones y pueblos indígena 
originario campesinos”. The Constitution confers to them a special position 
due to “their precolonial existence and their ancestral control of their terri-
tories”. Here the constitutional text already sets an important element of 
positive discrimination.
 Complementary to the definition of the state, Article 3 defines the 
Bolivian society and nation. It emphasizes the intercultural character already 
mentioned in Article 1 by stating that the Bolivian nation and people are 
formed by the totality of all Bolivians, the indigenous native peasant nations 
and peoples, and the intercultural and afro-bolivian communities:
La nación boliviana está conformada por la totalidad de las bolivianas y 
bolivianos, las naciones y pueblos indígena originario campesinos y las 
comunidades interculturales y afrobolivianas que en conjunto constituyen el 
pueblo boliviano.
3.1.2  Consequences of this Programmatic Change in the State’s Organization
The new Bolivian state is based on the idea of intercultural relations between 
the different communities and peoples that form the Bolivian nation. This 
concept of interculturalidad reflects the idea of relations between two or more 
cultures in a horizontal and synergic way. In this sense, none of the groups is 
superior to the other, and instead a horizontal dialogue and friendly 
coexistence based on respect for diversity and mutual enrichment is favored.15 
Following this idea, the new Constitution declares that “cultural diversity 
constitutes the essential basis of the Communitarian Plurinational State” and 
that “interculturalidad is the instrument of cohesion and harmonic, well-
balanced coexistence of all peoples and nations.”16 According to Xavier Albó 
this recognition of the preexistence of the indigenous population represents 
the true originality of the Bolivian constituent assembly and of this process of 
profound modification of the Constitution as a foundation of the social and 
political transformation of the state (2005).
 Álvaro García Linera, vice president of the government led by Evo 
Morales, has identified the dilemma of the historical division between the 
Bolivian state and Bolivian society due to the fact that the Bolivian state has 
always been “monoculturally, mestizo-white and Castilian-speaking” while 
Bolivian society is pluricultural, and in the case of the indigenous populations 
of the Aymara, and perhaps also the Quechua, even multinational (Lüthi, 2009: 
18). While in Latin America the state has traditionally tried to include all of 
these cultural and ethnic differences through policies of assimilation and the 
concept of ‘nation state’, the introduction of the concept of a ‘plurinational 
state’ finally changes this perspective (Josi, 2005). 
 This is reflected in the very first Article of the chapter concerning the 
fundamental rights of the citizen, Article 21 of the new Constitution, which 
guarantees the right of every citizen to “cultural self-identification”:
15 For more information on this concept see 
for example Servicios en Comunicación 
Intercultural, SERVINDI, “Interculturalidad, 
Desafío y Proceso en construcción”, Lima, 
Peru, 2005 (available at: http://servindi.
org/pdf/manual2.pdf), p. 30.
16 Article 98.1 of the Constitution.
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Las bolivianas y los bolivianos tienen los siguientes derechos:
1. A la autoidentificación cultural.
 Bearing in mind Bolivia’s history of exclusion and discrimination, it is 
also necessary to point out that with the introduction of individual rights in the 
course of the national revolution in the 19th century the “cognitive structure 
of a racialized or ethnicisized world” (Lüthi, 2009: 20) was not overcome, and 
discrimination along ethnic lines remained. This republican concept of 
citizenship, principally based on the individual rights of political participation, 
had not taken into account the more collective understanding of the political 
life of the indigenous population. In addition, as we noted above, while Article 
1 of the 2004 Constitution acknowledged Bolivia’s multiethnic and pluricul-
tural character, some scholars have argued that in practice this recognition 
did not involve any major change (Crabtree, 2007: 2). Article 21 and the imple-
mentation of the concept of a plurinational state in the new Constitution 
finally changes this. The existing multiple cultures of Bolivia have now been 
explicitly introduced into political governance with the main goals of 
overcoming the exclusion of the indigenous and peasant population, ending 
their suppression by the white, mestizo elite, and building an egalitarian and 
democratic state. Therefore, the truly innovative element of this new Consti-
tution is that it transports this acknowledgement of Bolivia’s diversity to the 
state structures. The definition of the state as “plurinational communitarian”17 
leads to recognition on the national political level.
 In this way, the government’s aim was to introduce what Taylor calls a 
“politics of difference” (Taylor: 1991), namely a politics of positive discrimi-
nation and of “revalorization of the indigenous cultures” (García Linera, 2005: 
82). This is to be achieved by “political equalization of cultures through a just, 
positive ‘ethnicization’ of State structures” and an “ethnic demonopolization” 
of politics (Ibid: 85). 
 The plurinational state, in Linera’s vision of the state, is aimed at putting 
an end to the “simulation of political modernity and cultural homogeneity in a 
society that is predominantly pre-modern, multicivilizational and pluricul-
tural” (García Linera, 2005: 55). The idea of the plurinational state originates in 
the social and cultural mixture of Bolivian society, and results in the new 
political structure of the state defined in the new Constitution. According to 
Romero, it thus responds to “the pluricultural character of the Bolivian 
society” (Romero Bonifaz, 2009: 43).
 However, there are also critical voices. A concrete fear, not only of the 
traditionally mestizo-white, Castilian-speaking and ruling elite of the country, 
is that the discrimination of the past will be reversed. Margoya states that one 
cannot deny the importance of this constitutional recognition of cultural and 
ethnic diversity for integrating previously excluded sectors of the population 
through an affirmative action policy which compensates for prior exclusion 
practiced by the state. However, he warns that this recognition should not turn 
into a reversed policy of difference and discrimination, and the elevation of a 
certain category of ‘we’ over another (2007: 41-42). In the same way Choque 
Aldana warns that the new concept of people and state that has dominated 
17 Article 1 of the Constitution.
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the Bolivian constitutional reform and recent politics, should not lead to a 
definition of the people as a ‘we’ based on a positive discrimination of those 
previously excluded and an exclusion of those previously ruling (2010: 500).  
 Nevertheless, as a conclusion we can say that this new vision of the 
state has served as a mechanism for overcoming long-lasting resentment for 
a large, but socially and politically excluded majority of indigenous people and 
for building a foundation for this new pluricultural society.
3.2. Important Impacts on the Rights of the  
 Indigenous Population
As we saw in the previous chapter, the new Bolivian Constitution finally 
endorses the pluricultural and plurinational character of the society and the 
state. In addition it has strengthened the rights of the indigenous population. 
Concretely, there has been an official recognition and numbering of the 36 
different indigenous languages in addition to Spanish, and the introduction of 
the ‘indigenous native peasant jurisdiction’ at the same hierarchical level as 
the ‘ordinary jurisdiction’. These two important examples will be discussed in 
greater detail below, as they represent two of the major aspects of the cultural 
identity of a group. On the one hand, language is probably the element most 
inextricably linked to cultural origin and identity of a person. It is fundamental 
to understanding values, beliefs, ideology and other intangible aspects of 
culture.18 On the other hand the legal system is an important aspect of the 
socio-cultural order in which a community lives. Social institutions, such as 
the legal system, determine the way in which people in a given society 
organize themselves in order to function as community, differentiated from 
others by specific rules, obligations and patterns of behavior.19 
3.2.1  The Recognition of Indigenous Languages as Official Languages
One of the important novelties of the new Constitution is the recognition of 36 
indigenous languages as official state languages. In this sense, Article 5.1 of 
the Constitution enumerates the 36 indigenous languages that are now equal 
to Spanish as official languages of the Bolivian state:
Son idiomas oficiales del Estado el castellano y todos los idiomas de las 
naciones y pueblos indígena originario campesinos, que son el aymara, 
araona, baure, bésiro, canichana, cavineño, cayubaba, chácobo, chimán, ese 
ejja, guaraní, guarasu’we, guarayu, itonama, leco, machajuyai-kallawaya, 
machineri, maropa, mojeñotrinitario, mojeño-ignaciano, moré, mosetén, 
movima, pacawara, puquina, quechua, sirionó, tacana, tapiete, toromona, 
uru-chipaya, weenhayek, yaminawa, yuki, yuracaré y zamuco.
 By this same logic, Article 5.2 regulates the use of the official 
languages, strengthening the role of the indigenous languages in official 
communications. It states that the plurinational (central) government and the 
18 State of World’s Indigenous Peoples, UN, 
Chapter II: Culture, p. 57 (available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/do-
cuments/SOWIP_chapter2.pdf).
19 Id., p. 62.
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departmental governments have to use at least two of the official languages in 
their administration. Of these, one has to be Spanish and the other should be 
chosen by duly taking into account the “convenience, circumstances, 
necessity, and preferences” of the local population in the relevant territory:
El Gobierno plurinacional y los gobiernos departamentales deben utilizar al 
menos dos idiomas oficiales. Uno de ellos debe ser el castellano, y el otro se 
decidirá tomando en cuenta el uso, la conveniencia, las circunstancias, las 
necesidades y preferencias de la población en su totalidad o del territorio en 
cuestión. Los demás gobiernos autónomos deben utilizar los idiomas propios 
de su territorio, y uno de ellos debe ser el castellano.
 A corollary of this official recognition of Bolivia’s plurilingual reality is 
the definition of certain collective rights of the indigenous population 
concerning the use of their native languages. In this context it is important to 
note that Article 30.1 of the Constitution defines that “all collectivity sharing 
the same cultural identity, language, historical tradition, institutions, territory 
and ‘cosmovision’ that predates the Spanish colonial invasion” shall be 
recognized as “indigenous native and peasant people and nation”.
Es nación y pueblo indígena originario campesino toda la colectividad humana 
que comparta identidad cultural, idioma, tradición histórica, instituciones, 
territorialidad y cosmovisión, cuya existencia es anterior a la invasión colonial 
española.
 Accordingly, these indigenous native and peasant people shall enjoy 
certain collective rights. Article 30.2, paragraph 12 of the Constitution states 
that “in the framework of the unity of the state and in accordance with the 
constitution” indigenous native and peasant peoples shall enjoy certain 
collective rights, such as, the right to an “intracultural, intercultural, and 
plurilingual education in the entire educational system”.
En el marco de la unidad del Estado y de acuerdo con esta Constitución las 
naciones y pueblos indígena originario campesinos gozan de los siguientes 
derechos: […] 
12. A una educación intracultural, intercultural y plurilingüe en todo el sistema 
educativo.
 Although the constitutional recognition of this cultural and linguistic 
diversity and the official recognition of the 36 indigenous languages are 
important steps towards a genuine pluralism, this mandate requires a series 
of steps for its concrete implementation. For example, the aforementioned 
right to a plurilingual education can only be guaranteed if there are sufficient 
teachers able to speak these indigenous languages. This, however, is mostly 
not the case. Also the obligation of the central and the departmental govern-
ments to use at least two of the official languages in their administration, 
presents a challenge which the governments have mostly not been able to 
comply with. 
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3.2.2  The Introduction of the ‘Indigenous Native Peasant Jurisdiction’
Another crucial modification in the new legal order is certainly the intro-
duction of ‘indigenous native peasant jurisdiction’ at the same hierarchical 
level as ‘ordinary jurisdiction’. 
 As we have already seen, Article 1 defines Bolivia as founded on its 
“political, economic, legal, cultural and linguistic diversity and pluralism”. On 
the one hand, this phrase touches upon diversity as a matter of fact (in 
Spanish pluralidad), and on the other hand on pluralism as a political mandate 
(in Spanish pluralismo) requiring concrete policies for its implementation 
(Rodríguez Veltzé, 2010: 47). The different elements of Bolivia’s diversity and 
pluralism that are enumerated in Article 1 are referred to again in other 
constitutional Articles, embedding the rights that correlate to this list. 
  Article 2 seems to translate this recognition of the (factual) diversity 
and (programmatic) pluralism to a more institutional level of state organi-
zation concerning the rights of the indigenous population. It recognizes the 
right of the indigenous native peasant nations and peoples to “their self-
determination within the framework of the unity of the State”, including “their 
right to autonomy, self-governance, their culture, the recognition of their 
institutions” (Rodríguez Veltzé, 2010: 50).
 Article 30.2 enumerates the concrete corollaries of these collective 
rights and recognizes in an extensive list of rights, among others, the right of 
the indigenous people to “have their own institutions be recognized as part of 
the general state structure” and to have “the application of their own political, 
legal and economic systems, according to their ‘cosmovision’”:
II. En el marco de la unidad del Estado y de acuerdo con esta Constitución las 
naciones y pueblos indígena originario campesinos gozan de los siguientes 
derechos:
 […]
5. A que sus instituciones sean parte de la estructura general del Estado.
[…]
14. Al ejercicio de sus sistemas políticos, jurídicos y económicos acorde a su
cosmovisión.
 Also, in relation to the organization of the state institutions, and more 
concretely the judiciary, the Constitution develops the diversity and pluralism 
stated in Article 1. Concretely concerning the faculty to administer their own 
jurisdiction, Article 178.1 underlines the relevance of legal pluralism in the new 
Bolivian Constitution by stating that the state’s faculty to adjudicate 
emanates of the Bolivian people and is based on certain principles, among 
others, “legal pluralism, interculturality […] and social harmony”:
La potestad de impartir justicia emana del pueblo boliviano y se sustenta en 
los principios de independencia, imparcialidad, seguridad jurídica, publicidad, 
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probidad, celeridad, gratuidad, pluralismo jurídico, interculturalidad, equidad, 
servicio a la sociedad, participación ciudadana, armonía social y respeto a los 
derechos.
 If we proceed to a historical analysis of the phenomenon of “legal 
pluralism” we can make the observation that since colonialism legal pluralism 
has been a reality in many countries of Latin America (Steiner, 2010: 8). In 
many cases, colonial and early republican authorities have accepted the 
existence of indigenous and native jurisdictions parallel to the ordinary state 
authorities. Often, this was due to the (at least implicit) acknowledgement 
that the indigenous jurisdiction was more efficient and more capable of 
resolving legal disputes between the members of a certain community, 
particularly in rural areas where the official state institutions and its ‘ordinary 
jurisdiction’ were absent. However, this ‘indigenous jurisdiction’ was recog-
nized only in a secondary role to the ‘ordinary jurisdiction’. Indigenous and 
native authorities and their jurisdiction were tolerated only concerning 
‘smaller’ cases and were hierarchically inferior to the ordinary jurisdiction.
 The official recognition of legal pluralism is therefore a recent 
phenomenon that reflects the increasing constitutional recognition of the 
social and cultural diversity of many of the Latin American countries (Josi, 
2005). However, the Bolivian vision of a fully-fledged recognition of indigenous 
jurisdiction on the same hierarchical level as ordinary jurisdiction is a novelty 
even in this Latin American context and certainly one of the most important 
innovations of this Constitution. 
 The official recognition of legal pluralism represents a true translation 
of the social and cultural pluralism of the society into the political and legal 
sphere. The consequences of this revolutionary step are both of theoretical 
and practical nature. As Veltzé states, on the one hand, it relates to a rupture 
with the traditional, monist concept of state, as the only authority competent 
to define legal norms and administer justice. On the other hand, this modifi-
cation has important consequences on a practical level, concerning the 
institutional re-designing of the state apparatus and the coordination and 
harmonization of the different levels of norms and authorities (2010: 11). 
 However, the Constitution unfortunately fails to clarify key issues, such 
as the definition and delimitation of the indigenous jurisdiction concerning its 
competence ratione loci, ratione personae and ratione materiae, as well as its 
coordination with the ‘ordinary jurisdiction’. In this sense it is, for example, not 
yet clear under which rule non-indigenous people would be adjudicated in 
cases where a law is broken within an indigenous territory. In addition, which 
jurisdiction would be competent to adjudicate in cases where indigenous 
people commit crimes outside of their indigenous community or territory? 
 Other crucial aspects relate to respect for universal human rights 
standards. Some of the practices that exist in the context of the indigenous 
jurisdiction have been criticized for violating certain human rights, and 
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particularly women’s rights standards (Käss/Bleese, 2010: 4). These are 
important aspects that have not been clarified by the Constitution.
 Another challenge has been a misunderstanding of this indigenous 
jurisdiction in a sense that it would allow people to take matters into their own 
hands. Since the principle of legal pluralism has been recognized in the 
Constitution, but details have not yet been clarified, there have been several 
incidents of ‘self-justice’ such as lynching. This has occurred when the new 
Constitution has been wrongly interpreted as allowing such acts. 
 Some of these critical aspects have been clarified in the long awaited 
coordinating law, the “Ley de Deslinde Jurisdictional”.20 While the first four 
Articles repeat the basic principles under which legal pluralism in Bolivia 
should be organized, Article 5 clarifies important questions, such as the 
respect for fundamental human rights, women’s rights and the guarantee of 
the right to life.21  
 It states that “all constitutionally recognized jurisdictions respect, 
promote and guarantee the right to life, and the other fundamental rights and 
guarantees recognized by the constitution”,22 as well as “the enjoyment of the 
rights of women, their participation, decision and presence […] both for the 
equal and just access to positions, as well as for the control, decision and 
participation in the administration of justice”.23 It furthermore establishes 
that “all constitutionally recognized jurisdictions prohibit and sanction any 
form of violence against children, adolescents and women” and declares 
illegal “any conciliation in this matter”.24 Finally, it defines clearly that 
“lynching is a human rights violation that is prohibited in any jurisdiction and 
will be prevented and sanctioned by the state”.25 Also Articles 7 through to 11 
attempt to delimit the scope and competence of the indigenous jurisdiction. 
However, in some aspects, the Articles fall short of defining the cases on the 
limits of its competence. 
 Even if the Coordinating Law is a crucial step for a better understanding 
and functioning of the indigenous jurisdiction, its application in practice has 
still to be proven. Some studies have shown that the importance of this law is 
more symbolic, as many controversial aspects cannot be truly reconciled.26  
According to Velazco27 the Coordinating Law has, in practice, confirmed the 
supremacy of the ordinary over the indigenous jurisdiction and has made the 
contradictions of the constitutional text even more apparent.
 The recognition of indigenous jurisdiction has been an important step 
towards taking cultural diversity seriously on political and legal terms. 
However, it has also led to the creation of certain areas of the country where 
the ordinary jurisdiction has little or no influence. The clear definition and 
delimitation of indigenous jurisdiction, as well as a good coordination with 
ordinary jurisdiction are important outstanding challenges for a successful 
implementation.
20 It has been adopted as Law 073 on Decem-
ber 29th, 2010.
21 Ley 073 – 2010, Art. 5: “Artículo 5. Respeto 
a los Derechos Fundamentales y Garantías 
Constitucionales”.
22 Id., Art. 5.1: “Todas las jurisdicciones re-
conocidas constitucionalmente, respetan 
promueven y garantizan el derecho a la 
vida, y los demás derechos y garantías 
reconocidos por la Constitución Política 
del Estado”.
23 Id., Art. 5.2: “Todas las jurisdicciones re-
conocidas constitucionalmente respetan 
y garantizan el ejercicio de los derechos 
de las mujeres, su participación, decisión, 
presencia y permanencia, tanto en el ac-
ceso igualitario y justo a los cargos como 
en el control, decisión y participación en la 
administración de justicia”.
24 Id., Art. 5.4: “Todas las jurisdicciones reco-
nocidas constitucionalmente, prohíben y 
sancionan toda forma de violencia contra 
niñas, niños, adolescentes y mujeres. Es 
ilegal cualquier conciliación respecto de 
este tema”.
25 Id., Art. 5.5: “El linchamiento es una vio-
lación a los Derechos Humanos, no está 
permitido en ninguna jurisdicción y debe 
ser prevenido y sancionado por el Estado 
Plurinacional”.
26 See study by Pedro Velazco "Ley de Des-
linde Jurisdiccional, ¿avances o retrocesos 
en la aplicación de la justicia indígena?" 
(available at: http://www.jornadanet.
com/n.php?a=87505-1).
27 Id.
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3.3. The Deepening of the Political Rights of 
 Participation
3.3.1 The Historical Alienation of the Political Elite and the Bolivian People
Another aspect of profound change in the new Constitution has been the 
framework for the political participation of the population. Traditionally, the 
Bolivian political system has been characterized by representative or 
delegated forms of political participation. While in the republican concept of 
citizenship active participation in processes of deliberation and decision-
making is crucial as it converts subjects into citizens, in Bolivia the idea of 
active participation historically has been reduced to mechanisms character-
istic of representative democracy. Accordingly, individual political rights, such 
as the right to vote, have had an important place in Bolivia’s political devel-
opment. However, this concept has never taken into account different mecha-
nisms of political participation which can be found in many of the indigenous 
communities of Bolivia.
 In addition, this focus on a Western-centered concept of political 
participation, according to many scholars, has led to a regime of monopoly for 
the political parties, limiting the means of political participation in the 
decision making process of the citizens to the general vote every four or five 
years (Romero Bonifaz, 2010: 23). At the same time, Romero asserts, the circle 
of political power dominated by the parties has increasingly distorted the 
democratic institutions of the state, as the public administration of the ruling 
actors responded more to ‘clientelistic’ relations than to programmatic 
compromises with their electorate (Romero Bonifaz, 2010: 23). Accordingly, 
the political administration has been increasingly disconnected from society 
and electoral mandates (Salazar Elena, 2008: 4).
 In particular, the area of economic policy illustrates this alienation of 
the population from the formal political system. Since the government of 
Victor Paz (1985-1989) economic policy has been seen as disconnected from 
the realities of people’s needs and demands of wider society.  We can observe 
that during the 80s and 90s the introduction of new economic policies was 
accompanied by protests and the imposition of a curfew by the respective 
governments (Gamarra, 2009: 363-393). In addition, as Salazar observes, 
ruling parties have been voted out of power by an unhappy electorate, but 
without provoking any substantial change in the economic policies of respon-
siveness of the elected representatives to the demands of the electorate 
(Salazar Elena, 2004: 23-56). This situation is a perversion of the ideal of 
representative democracy which holds that re-election is predicated on an 
ability to attend to the needs of the electorate (Fenichel Pitkin, 1985). The 
situation in Bolivia instead illustrates a profound disconnection between 
public policies and Bolivian society.
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 This disconnection became critical in a period of recession during the 
government of Hugo Bánzer (1997-2001), creating a space for a redefinition of 
the relationship between political elites and society. In April and September 
2000 there was a social crisis which included unexpected protests by various 
social sectors against the ruling elites. According to Mayorga this crisis was a 
turning point and reflects the disenchantment of wide parts of society with 
political actors and the increasing conviction that the process of political 
decision making could not continue to be limited to political parties (2005: 
149-178). In this context, Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe started to acquire 
importance as political figures and their peasant farmer’s movements were 
increasingly seen as legitimate political actors. In the 2002 elections Morales’ 
MAS and Quispe’s ‘Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti’ (MIP) represented a new 
political force, as an alternative to the traditional political elite who were 
being blamed for the social and political situation of the country (Salazar 
Elena, 2004). The strengthening of direct democracy mechanisms and the 
improvement in political participation of Bolivian society formed a central part 
of their election promises.
3.3.2 The Shift Towards Direct Democracy
The promise and use of direct democracy mechanisms and other forms of 
direct participation of civil society have been practiced extensively by populist 
political actors in different historical contexts (Salazar Elena, 2008; Papado-
poulos, 2001: 65-105; Canovan, 1999: 2-16). Often, and particularly in presi-
dential systems, they have been used to evade the limitations of the legal and 
institutional framework established by the Constitution and other national 
legislation, with the argument of strengthening direct participation of civil 
society (Uggla, 2008: 5, 17). In the same way, during their campaign in 2002, 
both Evo Morales and Quispe promised to give a bigger voice to Bolivia’s 
indigenous population and called for the substitution of the representative 
democracy system with a direct democracy inspired by traditional indigenous 
and communitarian structures (Mayorga, 2007). With such a promise they 
deepened and reinforced the antiparty tendency at this historical moment. By 
the time of the violent ‘octubre negro’ protests in 2003, the traditional political 
parties were also forced to abandon their objections to direct democracy and 
to accept the call for a referendum (on the gas issue) and for a constituent 
assembly. By doing this they hoped to avoid the breakdown of the government 
of Sánchez Lozada (Salazar Elena, 2008). However, as we now know, this 
optimism was unfounded and the dominance of the traditional party structure 
of politics in Bolivia continued to disintegrate. 
 The new Constitution decisively strengthens direct democracy mecha-
nisms and shifts the concept of the state from a classical representative 
democracy towards a more participatory one. Articles 7 and 11 define the new 
foundations of the political decision making processes. In a more general way, 
Article 7 defines that sovereignty resides in the Bolivian people who exercise it 
in a direct and delegated way:
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La soberanía reside en el pueblo boliviano, se ejerce de forma directa y 
delegada. De ella emanan, por delegación, las funciones y atribuciones de los 
órganos del poder público; es inalienable e imprescriptible. 
 Consequently, Bolivia’s Constitution adopts a mixed form of 
government, combining elements of the participatory, representative and 
communitarian democracy. Concretely, Article 11 states the following: 
I. La República de Bolivia adopta para su gobierno la forma democrática 
participativa, representativa y comunitaria, con equivalencia de condiciones 
entre hombres y mujeres.
II. La democracia se ejerce de las siguientes formas, que serán desarrolladas 
por la ley:
1. Directa y participativa, por medio del referendo, la iniciativa legislativa 
ciudadana, la revocatoria de mandato, la asamblea, el cabildo y la consulta 
previa. Las asambleas y cabildos tendrán carácter deliberativo conforme a 
Ley.
2. Representativa, por medio de la elección de representantes por voto 
universal, directo y secreto, conforme a Ley.
3. Comunitaria, por medio de la elección, designación o nominación de autori-
dades y representantes por normas y procedimientos propios de las naciones 
y pueblos indígena originario campesinos, entre otros, conforme a Ley.
 Article 11 therefore develops a system of government with “four dimen-
sions” or “levels” (Cordero Carraffa, 2010: 79/80) of direct, participatory, 
communitarian, but also representative elements. The traditional represent-
ative element is maintained in so far as general and free elections are used to 
elect political representatives. The development of direct and participatory 
mechanisms in the new Constitution improves the instruments of the refer-
endum and the legislative initiative (which had already existed in a limited 
form in the previous Constitution) and creates the possibility for recall 
referenda (similar to impeachment), as well as different types of consultative 
mechanisms (Ibid). Finally, the new text includes for the first time communi-
tarian mechanisms that allow the indigenous population to elect, design and 
nominate certain authorities according to the norms and procedures of 
indigenous native and peasant farming communities. According to Romero, 
these communitarian mechanisms of political participation are characterized 
by wide-ranging and inclusive deliberations leading to the adoption of more 
consensus based decisions, the direct participation of the members of the 
community and the rotation of authorities (Romero Bonifaz, 2009: 23).  Both 
the direct and participatory, as well as the communitarian mechanisms 
constitute a novelty in the Bolivian legal system (Cordero Carraffa, 2010: 
79/80).
 The novelty of this constitution is that it elevates for the first time 
‘customs and traditions’ (in Spanish usos y costumbres) of political partici-
pation and decision making of the indigenous and peasant farming commu-
nities to an equal constitutional rank (Cordero Carraffa, 2010: 79/80). On the 
Central Elements of the New Constitution
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one hand, the constitutional recognition of the equality of those forms of 
political participation represents an important step for a true acknowl-
edgment and acceptance of the traditionally marginalized and politically 
excluded indigenous communities. It thus constitutes an important element 
for a political reformulation of the state structure and democratic under-
standing of the Bolivian nation. On the other hand, these new political rights 
for indigenous and native communities also present a challenge for the new 
Bolivian state. As Carraffa states, while in traditional democratic mechanisms 
such as universal elections and referenda all citizens are subject to certain, 
previously defined and generally applicable conditions without any discrimi-
nation and limitation, this is not the case in indigenous mechanisms. These 
mechanisms are exclusively applicable to certain indigenous or native 
communities, not to all citizens in a general manner. Considering that the 
Constitution recognizes 36 nationalities, distributed in the whole territory of 
the state, Carraffa argues that the recognition of their own communitarian 
mechanism might provoke the creation of 36 micro states within the state and 
thus carries the risk of fragmentation of an already fragile state structure 
(2010: 79/80). 
 However, the positive outcome of the constitutional reform might 
override the risks. As Romero puts it, the governmental system is formed by 
the totality of political institutions that link the citizens with the government, 
including the direct or delegated forms of political participation in the 
processes of decision making as exercise of sovereignty of the people (Romero 
Bonifaz, 2009: 23). By combining liberal institutions of political participation 
with indigenous and native ones, the new Constitution widens its scope of 
representation to all groups of citizens and deepens the meaning of 
democracy: 
There are important improvements in the quality of democracy as measured in 
terms of representation and participation (inclusion and vertical account-
ability) […]. (Wolff, 2012: 5)
 In addition, one must not to forget that in Bolivia the shift towards direct 
democracy was not prompted by abstracted debate, but rather provoked by a 
concrete social demand by the Bolivian people in the 2003 protests. The 
demand for more participation reflected a deep crisis of representative 
democracy and an increasing division between the ruling elites and the 
Bolivian people. Although this crisis and the discourse calling for more direct 
democracy were cleverly used by political outsiders that emerged as new 
leaders during this ’crisis of representation’, they took up a real concern of the 
people and a long neglected stage in the development of Bolivian democracy.
Central Elements of the New Constitution
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Conclusion
The 2003 conflicts revealed profound resentment and frustration in wide parts 
of Bolivian society due to the historical discrimination and marginalization of 
the indigenous native and peasant population. The redefinition of national 
identity and the attendant constitutional recognition of cultural, ethnic, 
linguistic and legal pluralism as well as the deepening of the rights of political 
participation have been important aspects in overcoming this frustration and 
alienation of Bolivia’s population from its political decision making elite.
 The fact that the new Constitution recognizes defined collective rights 
for the indigenous, native and peasant population is a concrete step towards 
overcoming their historical discrimination in a state that was not able, nor 
willing, to adapt its structures and mechanisms to the plural reality of the 
country. However, as we have mentioned, this recognition has important 
implications. Particularly, the recognition of legal pluralism means that Bolivia 
is now a ‘plurinational state’ with a multiplicity of different nations, each with 
their own legislative and jurisdictional competence. The equal ranking of these 
two jurisdictions is, while reflecting the wish of a genuine recognition of 
Bolivia’s plural reality, an immense challenge of coordination and cohesion for 
the state. Different authorities, based on different legislation will now be able 
to adjudicate over social, political and economic conflicts. This could affect 
the unity of the state, if no clear and objective criteria for competence and 
mechanisms of coordination are established. Former President Eduardo 
Rodríguez Veltzé asserts that the concurrence of multiple ‘cosmovisions’, 
different cultures and various uses and practices represents an enormous 
challenge for an effective and harmonious coexistence of the cultural and 
legal diversity of the country. According to him, this coexistence has to be 
based on a genuine pluralism, aimed at enhancing the communication, 
exchange and coordination of the different systems on the basis of common or 
shared principles and standards (2009: 12). 
 In this context the development of mechanisms for civil society partici-
pation in the new Constitution is a modification that will undoubtedly change 
the life of Bolivia’s people, and particularly previously excluded parts of the 
society. As we have mentioned, one of the key aspects of this constitutional 
and institutional state reform was an intention to make the state more 
responsive to the people’s needs and mandates in the face of popular unrest, 
violence and fear of escalated conflict. The introduction of direct democracy 
mechanisms will certainly lead to an improved representation of the people’s 
mandate in daily politics and gives the Bolivian people the possibility of 
influencing and even directly taking part in the process of decision making. 
These are certainly important elements in this process of deepening 
democracy:
There can be no doubt that both Bolivia’s government and the parliament are 
considerably more representative today than ever before, and political partici-
pation – measurable in, but not limited to electoral events – has clearly 
grown. (Wolff, 2012: 5)
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 As a conclusion it is possible to claim that the revalorization of the 
indigenous character of parts of the population and its translation into the 
state’s structures has been an important aspect in Bolivia’s social and 
political transformation. However, one must caution against a view which sees 
such a transformation as complete. A prominent feature of current political 
discourses is what one could call ‘the quest for a better life.’ As Schaefer puts 
it, people’s everyday struggles are mostly not driven by questions of cultural 
or ethnic identity, but by ordinary issues, such as access to education, health 
and work:
Over the past century indigenous peoples in Bolivia […] who have fought for 
inclusion in projects of national modernity have above all desired tangible 
things, concrete opportunities to improve their social and material standing: 
access to schools, healthcare facilities, land, irrigation works, electricity, 
credit, perhaps even decently paid jobs in the urban centers. They have 
defined themselves not so much through their culture as through their visions 
for a national future into which they might fit their hopes… (Schaefer, 2009: 
411)
 Indeed, the specific conflicts discussed in this paper reflect these 
concerns, focused as they are on material conditions of life such as access to 
water. In this sense, Morlino indicates that a quality democracy requires a 
stable institutional structure that enables the liberty and the equality of all 
citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and 
mechanisms (2007: 2-22). After centuries of discrimination and marginali-
zation, the restructuring of the Bolivian state and nation required a genuine 
recognition of the pluricultural and pluriethnic character of the nation and the 
implementation of concrete policies for putting it into practice. 
 The new Constitution of Bolivia does exactly this. 
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